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control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated 
with liquidity, and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe 
agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative 
effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, 
both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is 
alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders. 
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The negative effect that control-ownership divergence of ultimate owners (the divergence between 
their control rights and cash-flow rights, also called excess control rights) has on firm value has been 
widely documented by previous studies1. This value-destroying effect is especially severe in countries 
with weak protection for minority shareholders2. Only recently have some studies begun to examine 
the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity, although there is abundant evidence 
that direct ownership (such as block, institutional, and insider ownership) affects market liquidity 
(Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998; Stoll, 2000; Cao et al., 2004; Rubin, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009). 
Attig et al. (2006) show that control-ownership divergence in Canadian firms is negatively related to 
market liquidity because ultimate owners of firms with excess control rights tend to disclose poor 
information, as they tend to have selfish agendas due to higher agency costs in those firms. 
 
Nevertheless, there is still no direct evidence on how control-ownership divergence affects market 
liquidity in emerging markets such as China, where legal protection for minority shareholders is weak. 
Particularly, there is no comprehensive analysis showing how the relationship between 
control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity is influenced by the unique institutional features in 
these emerging markets, which differ from those in a developed market as examined by Attig et al. 
(2006). First, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned firms (so-called non-SOEs) coexist. 
Compared to non-SOEs, SOEs have a more complex principal-agent relationship chain, which may 
result in more severe agency issue. Second, the legal system in China is weak, and the implementation 
of the legal system differs greatly across regions. Given that a better legal system can reduce 
information asymmetry, the variation in the legal system results in a variation in information 
asymmetry and agency problems in firms in different regions. Finally, Chinese firms have 
experienced an important market transformation (from the split share structure to a fully tradable 
share structure) through the non-tradable share (NTS) reform. The reform aligns the interests of 
different shareholders because it allows the originally non-tradable shares held by large shareholders 
                                                        
1 Previous studies include Faccio and Lang (2002), Lins (2003), Lemmon and Lins (2003), Maury and Pajuste (2004), 
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006), Gompers et al. (2010), and Lin et al. (2011). 
2 For example, Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Faccio et al. (2001, 2010).  
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to be tradable. Given that state ownership, a poorer legal system in some regions and the split share 
structure (before the NTS reform) are all associated with greater agency problems between controlling 
and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; 
Beltratti et al., 2011; Campello et al., 2011; Liu and Tian, 2012; Chen et al., 2012), those institutional 
features in China provide a unique settings to verify Attig et al. (2006)’s conjecture that the negative 
relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity is mainly caused by 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. This 
paper examines how the relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity varies 
across firms with and without state ownership; in regions with stronger or poorer legal systems; and 
before and after the NTS reform. Furthermore, the results by Attig et al. (2006) may be influenced by 
an endogeneity issue because there may be uncontrolled factors that jointly affect control-ownership 
divergence and stock liquidity. The NTS reform in China provides an ideal event to address the 
endogeneity issue because it was implemented by the Chinese government, and has thus been an 
exogenous shock to all Chinese firms.  
 
Using a sample from Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2009, our paper first confirms that 
control-ownership divergence has a negative impact on market liquidity, which is consistent with 
Attig et al. (2006). We also provide direct evidence that firms with control-ownership divergence have 
higher information asymmetry by using stock-price synchronicity as a measure of the information 
environment. In addition, we find that the negative effect of control-ownership divergence on market 
liquidity is greater in firms with severe agency problems and information asymmetry: SOEs and firms 
that locate in regions with weak protection for minority shareholders. This study thus documents that 
both the weak corporate governance mechanism in SOEs and the weak protection of minority 
shareholders worsen the negative effect that control-ownership divergence has on stock liquidity. We 
further provide evidence that the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and 
stock liquidity is greatly weakened after the NTS reform, especially in firms with more-severe agency 
conflicts. Our results are supported when liquidity variables are measured by low-frequency data. Our 
additional evidence shows the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock 
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liquidity and the reduction of the negative relationship after the NTS reform are both more 
pronounced in SOEs controlled by local governments than in SOEs controlled by the central 
government. 
 
By providing empirical evidence for the impact of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity, 
this study contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, this study extends the paper by 
Attig et al. (2006) by exploring institutional features in an emerging market (in this case, China) such 
as state ownership, the legal environment and market reforms, that influence the negative relationship 
between control-ownership divergence and market liquidity. We provide direct evidence that 
control-ownership divergence's negative effect on market liquidity is worsened by increased agency 
problems caused by both state ownership and weak protection for minority shareholders. Our study 
therefore contributes to agency theory and literature on the implications of control-ownership 
divergence for the stock market. In addition, literature on the effect of control-ownership divergence 
on stock liquidity may suffer from the potential endogeneity issue. This study provides fresh evidence 
that is less likely to be influenced by the endogeneity issue, as the study uses a natural-experiment 
method. Furthermore, the financial market in emerging markets is usually underdeveloped and 
hampered by various policy barriers for historical reasons; our study confirms that the importance of a 
proper privatisation process (such as the NTS reform) for an emerging market that aims to remove 
those barriers can greatly improve market liquidity. Therefore, this current study also has implications 
for market-oriented reforms in transition economies. Finally, one of the major consequences of the 
recent global financial crisis is that markets overall have become severely illiquid, which prolongs 
their recovery even further. Therefore, our study will have significant and timely policy implications 
for regulatory authorities in emerging markets. 
 
We organise the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 introduces the controlling structures and 
institutional environment in China, reviews the relevant literature, and develops testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the sample selection, variable definition, and regression models. Section 4 
discusses the results of our main empirical and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2 Institutional environment, literature review, and hypotheses development 
2.1 Controlling structures and institutional environment in China 
This study has chosen to examine Chinese firms because of their specific controlling structures and 
institutional environment, resulting in different agency conflicts and corporate governance in firms 
with different types of controlling shareholders, those in different regions, and those before and after 
the NTS reform. 
 
Over the past three decades, China has moved toward a market economy where ownership structures 
of Chinese corporations have been transformed from nearly 100% state-owned to a relatively 
diversified ownership. Initially, all Chinese listed firms were ultimately owned by the state. Over time, 
private entities or individuals have been allowed to become controlling shareholders in some listed 
firms through MBOs, or through mergers and acquisitions (Chow, 2007). Although the government 
still maintains its control or influence over SOEs through substantial ownership (Chen et al., 2008), 
non-SOEs established by entrepreneurs and other individual entities have also been encouraged to list 
their shares on Chinese stock markets in recent years. Therefore, a typical characteristic of the 
Chinese stock market is the co-existence of SOEs and non-SOEs. In the meantime, most Chinese 
corporations (both SOEs and non-SOEs) have a pyramid ownership structure established by the 
controlling shareholders with relatively low cash-flow rights (Fan et al., 2007). Therefore, there is 
sufficient variation of ownership to examine whether the relationship between control-ownership 
divergence and market liquidity varies between SOEs and non-SOEs.  
 
In addition, an important feature of the Chinese institutional environment is that the legal system is 
still quite weak and minority shareholders are weakly protected (Peng, 2001; Kato and Long, 2005). 
Nevertheless, although the legal system within China does not differ much from region to region, its 
implementation does3, which results in unequal protection for minority shareholders in different 
                                                        
3 As a typical example, according to the Supreme Court's judicial interpretation, the right of jurisdiction over all 
listed companies as defendants in a civil action belongs to the regional People’s Intermediate Court. In this 
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regions. China provides a unique dataset to examine whether the effect of control-ownership 
divergence on stock liquidity is affected by different levels of protection for minority shareholders 
within one country. 
 
For historical reasons, a split share structure was established in the Chinese capital market, whereby 
tradable shares were mostly held by individual investors and non-tradable shares (NTS) were mostly 
held by large shareholders before the NTS reform, which caused severe agency conflict and 
information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders. The NTS reform, which was 
implemented from 2005 to 2007, required large shareholders to convert their shareholdings to tradable 
shares. By removing a significant market friction, the reform greatly reduced the agency conflict 
between large and minority shareholders, because their interests were now aligned. Therefore, the 
effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity can be examined from a vertical frame; that 
is, to see whether the effect of control-ownership divergence on liquidity changes when the agency 
issue between shareholders is alleviated. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Ownership structure and stock liquidity 
Prior studies show that corporate ownership structure has a great impact on stock liquidity, especially 
under a concentrated-ownership structure. Theoretical works by Bolton et al. (1998) and Maug (1998) 
indicate that block ownership may influence firms’ stock liquidity through two major mechanisms: the 
trading-activity effect and the informed-trading effect. The trading-activity effect argues that if a large 
shareholder is present, the availability of shares is limited and fewer shareholders can trade the stock, 
which reduces the trade frequency (Demsetz, 1968); and discourages the acquisition and production 
of information (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). The informed-trading effect indicates that because large 
                                                                                                                                                                            
situation, the implementation of the legal system depends on whether the region has a well-developed free 
market with less government intervention in the economy. In regions that do not have a well-developed 
free-market economy, listed companies are more likely to influence the local judicial department (the regional 
People’s Intermediate Court) through networks or relationships, which dominate the Chinese economy. For 
example, Shanghai is considered to better implement the legal system than Tibet due to the former's freer market 
and better-developed economy. 
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shareholders usually have private information about the firm's value, the higher probability of 
informed trading decreases the liquidity.  
 
Empirical studies in recent years have attempted to investigate the relationship between ownership 
structure and stock liquidity by distinguishing the two effects. For example, Rubin (2007) finds that 
stock liquidity is positively related to total institutional ownership (a proxy for trading activity) but 
negatively related to institutional block holdings (a proxy for informed trading). Similarly, Brockman 
et al. (2009) find that block ownership is detrimental to stock liquidity, and that the relative lack of 
trading, rather than the threat of informed trading, better explains the negative relationship between 
block ownership and stock liquidity.  
 
2.2.2 The effect of control-ownership divergence 
After Claessens et al.'s (2000) seminal paper, which identifies the pyramiding ownership structure in 
eight East Asian economies, control-ownership divergence has been found to be associated with 
more-severe information asymmetry and agency conflicts between large controlling and minority 
shareholders, and that this impairs firm value (Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2004; Gompers et al., 2009) or results in 
value-destroying financial policies (Faccio et al., 2010; Liu and Tian, 2012). A few studies in recent 
years have also linked control-ownership divergence to stock liquidity. Attig et al. (2006) is the first of 
these to examine the relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity. Using a 
sample of Canadian publicly traded firms for the year 1996, they find that greater control-ownership 
divergence results in more severe information asymmetry and wider bid-ask spreads. They further 
argue that ultimate owners of firms with control-ownership divergence usually have a strong incentive 
to adopt a poor information-disclosure policy to pursue their private benefit. Similarly, Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2010) confirm Attig et al. (2006)’s argument using a sample of French firms, reporting that 
control-ownership divergence inherited in a pyramid structure impairs market liquidity, but double 
voting rights increase stock liquidity.  
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To sum up, the literature indicates that firms’ ownership structure does have an impact on market 
liquidity, but the few studies examining the effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity 
are all based on developed markets. This study attempts to complement the current literature by 
investigating the relationship between control-ownership divergence and liquidity in an emerging 
market with a unique institutional setting. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Control-ownership divergence and market liquidity 
As mentioned above, the literature implies that control-ownership divergence is associated with poor 
stock liquidity because the ultimate owners in these firms become entrenched, and they usually 
disclose inadequate information so they can pursue their private benefit (Attig et al., 2006). The 
conflict of interest between the ultimate owners and minority shareholders is particularly severe in 
transition economies like China, where protection for minority shareholders is still quite weak 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Kato and Long, 2005; Lin et al., 2011). Under this circumstance, ultimate 
owners with more excess-control rights may have a stronger incentive to minimise and delay the 
disclosure of information in an emerging market, which is harmful to market liquidity. Therefore we 
expect that the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity also 
exists in Chinese firms. Thus our first hypothesis is that: 
H1: Control-ownership divergence is negatively (positively) related to market liquidity 
(bid-ask spread or adverse selection cost) of Chinese firms. 
2.3.2 Control-ownership divergence, agency problem and stock liquidity 
However, the relationship between control-ownership divergence and liquidity may differ between 
SOEs and non-SOEs because their corporate governance mechanisms differ. In particular, the 
property rights of non-SOEs in China are naturally personal or family-based, which is similar to firms 
in the west, but SOEs have a specific corporate governance model with a multilayered principal-agent 
framework and an unclear clarification of ultimate property rights. Local and central government 
officials serving as principals hold the control rights in the name of the state, but they are not the 
residual claimants. Thus, no one in the principal-agent relationship chain has any incentive to 
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maximise profits for the actual principal (Liu et al., 2011). This means that everyone in the chain may 
have a strong incentive to pursue their own personal benefit, which results in a much more severe 
agency problem and information asymmetry in SOEs. Chung et al. (2010) find that better stock 
liquidity is positively related to firms’ corporate governance. Thus, we expect that this poor corporate 
governance and the severe agency problem in SOEs strengthen the negative relationship between 
control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity. Thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
 H2a: The interaction of control-ownership divergence and the SOE dummy is negatively 
(positively) related to stock liquidity (bid-ask spread or adverse selection cost). 
 
If the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and liquidity stems from a firm’ 
poorer information disclosure (Attig et al., 2006), it is reasonable to expect that this relationship is 
particularly strong in regions where the minority shareholders are poorly protected. This is because 
the legal system operating in regions with strong protection for minority shareholders can reduce 
opportunism and asymmetric information (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Therefore, we 
expect that the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and liquidity is stronger in 
regions with poorer protection for shareholders and vice-versa, and propose the following hypothesis:  
H2b: The interaction of control-ownership divergence and the poor legal system dummy is 
negatively (positively) related to stock liquidity (bid-ask spread or adverse selection cost). 
 
2.3.3 Control-ownership divergence, NTS reform, and stock liquidity 
As discussed above, the split share structure harmed market liquidity because it increased the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. However, after the NTS reform, 
shares held by large shareholders gradually become tradable, which aligned the interests of large and 
minority shareholders by linking large shareholders’ wealth directly to share prices. Thus we propose 
the following hypothesis to provide evidence for this expectation: 
H3a: The interaction of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform is positively 
(negatively) associated to stock liquidity (bid-ask spread or adverse selection cost). 
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If, as expected, the agency problems are more severe in SOEs and firms in regions with a weak legal 
system, and such agency problems are alleviated after the NTS reform, it would be reasonable to 
argue that the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity is 
weakened more significantly in SOEs and firms in regions with a weak legal system. Thus we 
hypothesise that: 
H3b: The interaction of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform has a stronger positive 
(negative) effect on stock liquidity (bid-ask spread or adverse selection cost) in SOEs or firms 
that locate in regions with a poor legal system that provides weak protection for investors.  
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Data collection and sample selection 
Our data is collected mainly from the CSMAR database. Particularly, the spread of information is 
collected from the High Frequency Database of Chinese Listed Firms (2005–2009); the information 
regarding firms’ ownership structure (including proportion of tradable in each year) is collected from 
the Chinese Listed Firm Shareholder Research Database (2005–2009); and the NTS reform 
information is collected from the Chinese Listed Firms Non-Tradable Share Reform Database (2005–
2009).  
 
To calculate market liquidity, we exclude (1) data observations that are not during normal trading 
times (i.e., 9:30-11:30 and 13:00-15:00)4; and (2) the volume, price, and quote non-positive data 
records. In addition, we exclude ‘ST’ or negative-equity firms (financially distressed firms) because 
these shares are traded according to different rules. The final sample consists of 1,718 observations of 
345 firms’ panel data from 2005 to 20095.  
                                                        
4 Stock exchanges in China operate five days a week, except for holidays. The normal trading hours are 9:30 
AM to 11:30 AM and 13:00 PM to 15:00 PM. There is also a pre-trading session from 9:00 AM to 9:30 AM 
each day. However the pre-trading session uses a periodic call auction, which is a different method from that 
used during the normal trading hours (the continuous, discriminating auction) (Xu, 2000).  
5 There are two Securities Exchanges in China: the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen 
Securities Exchange (SZSE). A significant difference between the two stock exchanges is the sizes of the listed 
companies. In addition, the closing price for stock on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is the last traded price of a 
continuous transaction. In contrast, the closing price of stock on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is determined 
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3.2 Measuring variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
In accordance with Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009), we calculate two variables to measure stock 
liquidity using high-frequency data. The first is the bid-ask effective spread (BAES)6, which is defined 
as the absolute value of twice the difference between the transaction price and the mid-price recorded 
at the time of the transaction. Second, according to Glosten and Harris (1988), information asymmetry 
is another important component for measuring stock liquidity, so we further calculate the adverse 
selection cost (ADSC-GH) as a proxy for information friction7. As our regressions are based on years, 
we use the annual average of the above two measures of liquidity to reduce the errors associated with 
a single day, and obtain a single observation for each firm in each year. 
 
Stock-price synchronicity (SYNCH) is also calculated in this paper to measure the information 
asymmetry of individual firms. Following Morck et al. (2000), we first estimate the following 
regression:  
titmiiti RR ,,10, εββ ++=                                         Equation (1) 
where tiR ,  is the return of stock i at day t, and tmR ,  is the market return at day t. The variable 
SYNCH is defined as: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
using the call auction, whose closing time is three minutes (that is, from 14:57 to 15:00). Apart from that, there 
is no other significant difference between them; they are both typical, pure order-driven markets that have 
adopted a centralised, scriptless, computerised order matching system which has functioned remarkably well. 
Due to the availability of data, we only included those firms listed on the SZSE. 
6 We also calculate the bid-ask quoted spread (BAQS), which is defined as the daily average value of the 
difference between the bid price and the ask price, and conduct regressions using this variable as measure of 
stock liquidity. The regression results are not reported in the study because they are very much similar to the 
results using BAES as dependent variable. Both variables are highly correlated. 
7 Based on Glosten and Harris (1988), the total adverse selection cost percentage is 2(z0+z1 V )/[2(z0+z1
V )+2(c0+c1V )]. Where the numerator is information asymmetry or adverse selection component, and the 
denominator is the sum of the order processing component and the inventory holding component. In this 
formula, V  is the average share volume, while z0, z1, c0, and c1 are estimated from the following equation: △Pt 
= c0△Qt + c1△QtVt +z0Qt + z1QtVt + et. Where Pt is the trade price at time t; Qt = +1 if the trade at time t is 
buyer-initiated and Qt = -1 if it is seller-initiated, and Vt is the number of shares traded per transaction at time t 










                                                  Equation (2) 
where 2R is the coefficient of determination from the estimation of Eq (1). We then calculate the 
annual average of the daily SYNCH to obtain a single observation for each firm in each year. 
 
For robust results, we further calculate three low-frequency liquidity measures: trading volume 
(VOLUME), turnover ratio (TURNOVER), and illiquidity ratio (ILLIQUIDITY). VOLUME and 
TURNOVER are defined as the yearly average trading volume (turnover ratio), while ILLIQUIDITY is 
the yearly average daily illiquidity ratio, which is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute 
return to the (dollar) trading volume on that day (Amihud, 2002). 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Control-ownership divergence (DIVERGENCE) is defined in this paper, as in Lin et al. (2011), as the 
difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owners8. Cash-flow rights 
are measured by the sum of the products of the proportion of ownership along the control chains, 
while control rights are the minimum proportion of ownership along the control chains.  
 
NTS reform (REFORM) is defined in this paper as a dummy variable that equals 1 for a firm-year 
observation in the post-reform period, and 0 for observations before or in the NTS reform year. 
 
We also define a dummy variable (SOE) that equals 1 if the firm is ultimately owned by Chinese 
central or local governments and 0 otherwise. Within the SOEs sample, a dummy variable 
(CENTRALSOE) is further defined if the SOE is ultimately controlled by the central government.  
 
According to Liu et al. (2011), the regional-division criterion widely used to measure variations in 
                                                        
8 According to the CSRC definition, the “ultimate owner” of a listed company is: (1) the largest shareholder, or 
(2) the shareholder with more voting rights than the largest shareholder, or (3) the shareholder with shareholding 
or voting rights above 30% of the total shares or voting rights in the company, or (4) the shareholder who can 
determine over half of the board members. 
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institutional development in China is the division between the eastern (coastal) region and the 
non-eastern region, including both the central and western regions. The eastern region (the coastal 
provinces) is considered to protect its minority shareholders better due to its advantageous 
geographical positioning, as well as its well-established market economy and effective legal system9. 
Thus, we define a region dummy variable (POORREGION) that equals 1 if the firm is registered in 
the central or western regions and 0 otherwise.  
 
Finally, to control the effect of other factors that have an impact on market liquidity, we also include 
several control variables. The percentage of tradable shares, institutional ownership, stock closing 
price, total market capitalisation, and trading risk are included to control the effect of firm-specific 
factors, while market return and market trading volume are there to control the potential effect of 
market conditions (Chordia et al., 2001; Rosch and Kaserer, 2013; Qian et al., 2013). Table 1 defines 
in detail all variables used in this paper.  
<Table 1> 
3.3 Regression models 
Our base regression models are as follows: 
1 2α β β εi,t i,tY DIVERGENCE X= + + +                                      Equation (3) 
1 2 3 4α β β β * εi,t i,t i,tY DIVERGENCE REFORM DIVERGENCE REFORM Xβ= + + + + +  
     
Equation (4) 
In Equations (3) and (4), i and t represent the firm and year, and  is the error term. The dependent 
variables Y are proxies for market liquidity and information asymmetry, which includes bid-ask 
effective spreads (BAES), adverse selection cost (ADSC-GH), trading volume (VOLUME), turnover 
ratio (TURNOVER), illiquidity ratio (ILLIQUIDITY), and stock-price synchronicity (SYNCH). The 
key independent variables are control-ownership divergence (DIVERGENCE), NTS reform 
(REFORM), and their interaction term, while X is a vector of control variables.  
 
                                                        
9 The eastern region covers Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, and Hainan. The central and west regions include Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. 
ε
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Sample description and univariate tests 
The descriptive statistics and univariate test results are reported in Table 2, of which panel A gives the 
summary statistics; panel B presents the results for univariate tests of stock liquidity based on whether 
the firms have control-ownership divergence or not; and panel C presents the results for 
difference-in-difference tests of stock liquidity of firms with and without control-ownership 
divergence, and with different levels of agency problems. Lastly, panel D presents the results for 
difference-in-difference tests of stock liquidity in firms with and without control-ownership 
divergence and before and after the NTS reform. 
 
Panel A shows that the average effective spread in the Chinese stock market is 0.02 RMB, and the 
adverse selection costs account for 39.1% of spread, on average. In addition, the average stock-price 
synchronicity is -0.12, which is close to the -0.23 reported by Hasan et al. (2013) for Chinese markets, 
but much higher than the -1.74 reported for the US market (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). 
Consistent with Hasan et al. (2013), our results indicate that the information-asymmetry problem in 
the Chinese market is more severe than in the US because the stock price in the Chinese market is 
more likely to co-move with the market index. Our low-frequency measurements of market liquidity 
show that the average trading volume, turnover ratio, and illiquidity are 81.90 million RMB, 3%, and 
0.04 (×10 Million) respectively. Regarding the independent variables, we find that the average 
control-ownership divergence of our sample firms is around 6%, with controlling shareholders’ 
cash-flow rights of 39%.  
 
 Panel B shows that firms with control-ownership divergence have a higher bid-ask effective spread 
(BAES) and adverse selection cost (ADSC-GH) than firms without it, and the differences are 
statistically significant in terms of both mean and median. As high BAES and ADSC-GH both indicate 
poor stock liquidity, our results provide evidence that control-ownership divergence has a negative 
impact on stock liquidity.  
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As expected, panel C shows that SOEs with control-ownership divergence have significantly higher 
BAES and ADSC-GH (poor liquidity), indicating that control-ownership divergence has a significantly 
negative impact on stock liquidity. Similarly, control-ownership divergence is found to have a 
significantly negative effect on stock liquidity for firms in regions with a poor legal system. However, 
no significant relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity is found for 
non-SOEs or firms in regions with an effective legal system (only one out of four tests of difference is 
significant). In contrast, the difference-in-difference test results are all significant, indicating that the 
interaction effect of SOE (POORREGION) and control-ownership divergence is also significantly 
associated to stock liquidity. 
 
Panel D shows that the BAES and ADSC-GH both decrease significantly after the NTS reform in firms 
with control-ownership divergence only, suggesting that the stock liquidity in those firms is greatly 
improved after the NTS reform. The difference-in-difference test results are both significant, which 
confirms that the interaction of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform have a negative 
(positive) effect on the study's dependent variables (stock liquidity). 
 
We also conduct correlation-coefficient tests between independent variables, but the results are not 
reported to save space. Our correlation matrix results indicate that our results do not suffer from 
serious multi-collinearity problems. 
<Table 2> 
4.2 Control-ownership divergence and market liquidity 
Table 3 presents the regression results of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity using 
BAES and ADSC-GH as measures of market liquidity. 
 
Consistent with our expectation and the results from the univariate test, the coefficients of 
DIVERGENCE are consistently positive and significant in both economic magnitude and statistical 
significance, when stock liquidity is measured using BAES or ADSC-GH as dependent variables. 
Specifically, we suggest that a 1% increase in control-ownership divergence by the controlling 
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shareholders results in an increase of 0.017% in bid-ask spreads, and 0.195% in adverse selection cost. 
Therefore, the overall results in Table 3 support our hypothesis H1, indicating that control-ownership 
divergence has a negative impact on stock liquidity.  
 
In addition, the results show that the ultimate owners’ cash-flow rights have a negative impact on 
stock liquidity. The proportion of tradable shares is negatively related to both the bid-ask spread and 
adverse selection cost, which indicates that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of 
tradable shares and market liquidity. This result is consistent with our expectation that firms’ stock 
liquidity increases when the proportion of tradable shares increases after the NTS reform. 
Furthermore, we show that bid-ask spreads and adverse selection costs (stock liquidity) are negatively 
associated with institutional ownership, and that the year-end closing price and stock trading risk are 
positively related to stock liquidity, while firms with large market capitalisation have better liquidity. 
This confirms previous studies from Attig et al. (2006), Rubin (2007), and Brockman et al. (2009). 
Finally, similar to Qian et al. (2013), the results confirm that the market-commonality component has 
strong explanatory power for individual stocks by showing that stock liquidity increases when the 
market return is higher. 
<Table 3> 
 
4.3 The effect of control-ownership divergence on liquidity of firms with different levels of agency 
problems 
We have shown that control-ownership divergence has a negative effect on market liquidity. If, as 
expected, the negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock market liquidity 
stems from the agency problem and its induced poor information disclosure, this negative relationship 
should be strengthened in SOEs and firms in regions with poor legal systems, both of which suffer 
from more-severe agency problems. In this subsection, we attempt to examine the effect of 
control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity in firms with different levels of agency problems.  
 
Table 4 presents the regression results on the interaction effect of DIVERGENCE and the SOE dummy 
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(POORREGION dummy) on stock liquidity. The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that the 
interaction term of DIVERGENCE and the SOE dummy are statistically and economically related in a 
significantly positive way to adverse selection cost. Thus our results suggest that the positive 
(negative) relationship between control-ownership divergence and adverse selection costs (stock 
liquidity) is weakened in SOEs, which is consistent with our hypothesis H2a. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 present the effect of control-ownership divergence and regional legal system on 
stock liquidity.  We expect that control-ownership divergence should have a stronger positive impact 
on bid-ask spread and adverse selection cost in firms in regions with poor legal systems. Not 
surprisingly, our results confirm that the interaction of DIVERGENCE and the POORREGION 
dummy is significantly positively associated with our dependent variables. Therefore our hypothesis 
H2b is also proven, indicating that the negative impact of the control-ownership divergence on stock 
liquidity is exaggerated by a poor legal system.  
<Table 4> 
 
4.4 The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on stock liquidity 
To investigate whether the negative impact of the control-ownership divergence on market liquidity is 
alleviated when controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate is reduced after the NTS reform, the 
interaction effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on stock liquidity is examined. 
Our expectation is that the negative effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity should 
be weakened after the NTS reform, particularly in firms with severe agency problems. The results are 
reported in Table 5, of which panel A reports the full sample regression results, while panels B and C 
report the regression results based on different subsamples. 
 
The results in panel A show that the interaction of DIVERGENCE and the REFORM dummy is 
significantly negatively related to the study's dependent variables. This confirms that the positive 
(negative) effect of control-ownership divergence on both bid-ask spread and adverse selection cost 
(liquidity) are weakened after the NTS reform. These results are also consistent with our hypothesis 
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H3a. Panels B and C show that the interaction of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform has a 
statistically significantly negative effect only on the adverse selection cost of firms with severe agency 
problems; that is, SOEs and firms in regions with a poor legal-protection system, although it has a 
similar effect on the bid-ask spread of firms with different levels of agency problems. The results 
confirm that the positive (negative) relationship between control-ownership divergence and adverse 




4.5 The effect of control-ownership divergence on information asymmetry 
So far we have provided evidence that control-ownership divergence does have a negative impact on 
stock liquidity, and conjectured that the negative impact is caused by information asymmetry and 
agency problems. However, we have not had direct evidence about whether control-ownership 
divergence has an effect on information asymmetry that can be directly measured by stock-price 
synchronicity. Thus, in this section we examine the effect of control-ownership divergence (and NTS 
reform) on stock-price synchronicity.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present the results based on the full sample. We find that DIVERGENCE 
is positively associated with stock-price synchronicity, indicating that the information asymmetry in 
firms with higher control-ownership divergence is higher than that in firms with lower or no 
divergence; this is consistent with our expectation. Further, we show that the interaction of 
DIVERGENCE and NTS reform is significantly negatively associated with firms with severe agency 
problems; that is, SOEs and firms in regions with poor legal systems.  This indicates that the 
information asymmetry in firms with more-severe agency problems is significantly reduced after the 
NTS reform. Overall, the results in Table 6 confirm our argument that information asymmetry is the 




4.6 Additional tests 
This section provides robustness test results for our main results. First, we conduct a change 
regression to see whether the control-ownership divergence before the NTS reform is associated with 
a greater change in stock liquidity10; second, we repeat our main test using a low-frequency 
measurement of stock liquidity; and finally, we further examine whether control-ownership 
divergence's impact on the liquidity of SOEs controlled by central governments is different from its 
impact on the liquidity of those controlled by local governments.  
 
4.6.1 The effect of control-ownership divergence on change of stock liquidity after the NTS reform 
Table 7 gives the regression results on the effect of control-ownership divergence (before the NTS 
reform) on the change of stock liquidity after the NTS reform. The bid-ask spread and adverse 
selection cost of firms with higher control-ownership divergence fall significantly after the NTS 
reform, which is consistent with the findings in Table 5. We also conduct regressions on the effect of 
DIVERGENCE and NTS reform on change of stock liquidity for firms with different levels of agency 




4.6.2 The effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity (low-frequency data) 
Table 8 presents the results showing the effect of control-ownership divergence, NTS reform, and their 
interaction on stock liquidity using low-frequency data to measure stock liquidity. Following Amihud 
(2002), we adopt trading volume (VOLUME), turnover ratio (TURNOVER), and illiquidity ratio 
(ILLIQUIDITY) as low-frequency liquidity measures.  
 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 8 show that control-ownership divergence is significantly negatively associated 
with trading volume, and significantly positively associated with illiquidity ratio. This indicates that firms 
                                                        
10 Normally the change of stock liquidity after the NTS reform should be used to regress on the change of all 
independent variables, including change in DIVERGENCE and change in TRA; however, there are very few 
changes of DIVERGENCE and TRA during the lock-up period. So we examine the effect of the average value of 
DIVERGENCE and TRA before the NTS reform on the change of stock liquidity. 
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with more control-ownership divergence usually have poorer market liquidity. The interaction of 
DIVERGENCE and NTS reform is significantly positively (negatively) associated with trading volume 
(illiquidity ratio), which implies that the negative (positive) relationship between control-ownership 
divergence and trading volume (illiquidity ratio) is weakened significantly after the NTS reform. Thus our 
main results are confirmed by the results shown in Table 8. 
<Table 8> 
 
4.6.3 The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on stock liquidity of SOEs 
controlled by central and local governments 
Recent studies by Chen et al. (2009) and Cheung et al. (2012) find that local and central government 
ownership have different impacts on firm performance. In particular, SOEs controlled by local 
governments usually perform worse than those controlled by the central government due to weak 
monitoring and supervision from the government. This suggests that the negative relationship between 
control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity should be more pronounced in local SOEs due to 
weaker monitoring and supervision leading to their more-severe agency problems. Not surprisingly, 
the results in Table 9 do show that DIVERGENCE is significantly positively associated with bid-ask 
spread and adverse selection cost of SOEs controlled by local governments. In addition, we find the 
positive impact of control-ownership divergence on bid-ask spread and adverse selection cost is 
weakened more significantly in local SOEs after the NTS reform.   
<Table 9> 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity using a unique 
sample of Chinese listed firms. We find that firms with larger control-ownership divergence have 
higher bid-ask spreads and adverse selection costs – i.e., poorer market liquidity – than firms with 
smaller divergence. We further show that the negative impact of control-ownership divergence on 
stock liquidity is exaggerated by the more-severe agency problems in SOEs and firms in regions with 
poor legal systems that provide weak protection for minority shareholders. Moreover, using the NTS 
reform as an exogenous shock, we find that the negative (positive) relationship between 
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control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity (stock-price synchronicity) is alleviated after the 
NTS reform which has greatly reduced the agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders, particularly in firms with severe agency problems. Our additional evidence supports our 
findings by showing that firms with larger control-ownership divergence are associated with greater 
reduction in bid-ask spread and adverse selection cost after the NTS reform; control-ownership 
divergence is associated with greater stock illiquidity, measured by low-frequency data; and the 
negative relationship between control-ownership divergence and stock liquidity is more pronounced 
in local SOEs than in central SOEs. 
 
Overall, this study provides evidence from an emerging market for a negative effect of 
control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. The results are consistent with previous literature 
from Attig et al. (2006) for developed markets. More importantly, we provide further evidence that in 
emerging markets such as China, the negative impact of control-ownership divergence on market 
liquidity is exacerbated by both state ownership and weak protection for minority shareholders, both 
of which increase information asymmetry and agency conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. However, the NTS reform, which aims to improve the efficiency of capital 
markets and align the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, has reduced the 
negative impact that control-ownership divergence has on market liquidity. Our results suggest that in 
emerging markets, institutional features, such as state ownership, regional development, and market 
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variables Symbols Calculation 
Dependent variables   
High-frequency liquidity measures 
Bid-ask effective spread  BAES Annual average of the daily absolute value of twice the 
difference between the transaction price and the mid-price 
recorded at the time of the transaction. 
Adverse selection cost ADSC-GH Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection11. 
Information asymmetry measures 
Stock-price synchronicity  SYNCH Stock-price synchronicity, following Morck et al. (2000)12.  
Low frequency liquidity measures 
Trading volume VOLUME Yearly average trading volume of the stock. 
Turnover TURNOVER Yearly average turnover ratio of the stock. 
Illiquidity ratio  ILLIQUIDITY Yearly average daily illiquidity ratio, which is defined as 
the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the (dollar) 
trading volume on that day (Amihud, 2002). 
Independent variables   
Control-ownership divergence 
(excess control rights)  
DIVERGENCE Divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate owner. 
NTS reform REFORM A dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation is in the 
post-reform period, and 0 otherwise. 
Cash-flow rights  CASHFLOW Sum of the products of the proportion of ownership along 
the control chains. 
Tradable-shares percentage  TRA Tradable shares to Total outstanding shares. 
Institution  ownership IO Year-end fund's holdings/total shares. 
Price PRICE Year-end closing prices. 
Total size SIZE Year-end total market capitalisation.  
Stocks trading risk RISK Daily returns standard deviation of year. 
Market return MRETURN Yearly return of the market index. 
Market trading volume MVOL Yearly trading volume of the overall market. 
Classification variables   
SOE dummy SOE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is ultimately 
controlled by the government and 0 otherwise. 
Poor region dummy POORREGION A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is located in a 
region with a poor legal system and 0 otherwise13. 
                                                        
11 See footnote 6 for detailed calculation for this variable. 
12 See Section 3.2.1 for a detailed definition. 
13 See Section 3.2.2 for a detailed definition. 
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Central SOEs dummy CENTRALSOE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the SOE is ultimately 
controlled by the central government and 0 if the SOE is 
controlled by a local government. 
In regression analysis, natural logarithms of VOLUME, ILLIQUIDITY, and SIZE are used to 
















































Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       BAES (RMB) 1718 0.02  0.14  0.02  0.01  0.21  
ADSC-GH 1723 0.39  0.40  0.18  -3.19  1.85  
SYNCH 1725 -0.12  -0.10  0.42  -3.26  0.91  
VOLUME (Million RMB) 1725 81.90  43.60  139.00  0.09  2120.00  
TURNOVER 1725 0.03  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.25  
ILLIQUIDITY (10 Million) 1725 0.04  0.01  0.28  0.00  10.6  
       DIVERGENCE 1720 0.06  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.38  
REFORM 1725 0.66  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00  
CASHFLOW 1720 0.31  0.28  0.17  0.01  0.85  
TRA 1725 0.59  0.56  0.21  0.06  1.00  
IO 1718 0.05  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.67  
PRICE 1718 9.74  7.05  9.17  1.65  85.60  
SIZE (Million RMB) 1725 5933.57  2511.27  12619.84  263.47  208502.00  
RISK 1718 0.04  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.62  
MRETURN  1725 0.62 1.03 0.85 -0.63 1.68 
MVOL (Billion RMB) 1725 1807.29 1795.99 1290.70 190.79 3453.64 
       SOE 1725 0.72  1.00  0.45  0.00  1.00  
REGION 1725 0.49  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  




Panel B. Univariate tests of stock liquidity for firms with and without control-ownership divergence 
Var. DIVERGENCE NON-DIVERGENCE Diff. 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
  BAES (%) 2.02 1.48 1.68 1.36 0.34*** 0.12*** 
ADSC-GH (%) 40.64 41.87 37.47 39.02 3.18*** 2.85*** 
‘DIVERGENCE’ and ‘NON-DIVERGENCE’ refer to firms with and without control-ownership divergence respectively; 
‘DIFF.’ refers to the differences of mean and median of stock liquidity in firms with and without control-ownership 











Panel C. Difference-in-difference test for stock liquidity of firms with and without control-ownership 
divergence in firms with different levels of agency conflict 
Var. 
 
SOEs NON-SOEs Diff. 
BAES (%) 
DIVERGENCE 2.12 1.93 0.19 
NON-DIVERGENCE 1.65 1.97 -0.32*** 
Diff. 0.47*** -0.04 0.51*** 
ADSC-GH (%) 
DIVERGENCE 41.73 39.56 2.17 
NON-DIVERGENCE 37.31 39.03 -1.72 
Diff. 4.42*** 0.53 3.89*** 




DIVERGENCE 2.09 1.96 0.13 
NON-DIVERGENCE 1.63 1.72 0.09 
Diff. 0.46*** 0.24** 0.22* 
ADSC-GH (%) 
DIVERGENCE 41.9 38.4 3.50*** 
NON-DIVERGENCE 37.77 37.17 0.6 
Diff. 4.13*** 1.23 2.90*** 
‘DIVERGENCE’ and ‘NON-DIVERGENCE’ represent firms with and without control-ownership divergence respectively; 
‘SOEs’ and ‘NON-SOEs’ represent firms that are ultimately controlled by the government or not; ‘POORREGION’ and 
‘RICHREGION’ represent firms located in regions with poor or strong legal systems; ‘DIFF.’ refers to the 
difference-in-difference tests of mean; and *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel D. Difference-in-difference test for stock liquidity of firms with and without control-ownership 
divergence before and after NTS reform 
  
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM Diff. 
BAES (%) 
DIVERGENCE 2.25 1.92 0.33** 
NON-DIVERGENCE 1.77 1.79 -0.02 
Diff. 0.48*** 0.13* 0.35*** 
ADSC-GH (%) 
DIVERGENCE 43.42 39.31 4.11** 
NON-DIVERGENCE 37.81 37.28 0.53 
Diff. 5.61*** 2.03*** 3.58** 
‘DIVERGENCE’ and ‘NON-DIVERGENCE’ represent firms with and without control-ownership divergence respectively; 
‘PRE-REFORM’ and ‘POST-REFORM’ represent the pre- and post-NTS reform periods; ‘DIFF.’ refers to the 
















Table 3. The effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity 
Var. BAES ADSC-GH 
   DIVERGENCE 0.017***  0.195***  
 
0.000  0.000  
CASHFLOW -0.007**  -0.009  
 
0.013  0.763  
TRA -0.011***  -0.159***  
 
0.000  0.000  
IO 0.000  0.006***  
 
0.128  0.000  
PRICE 0.001***  0.008***  
 
0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.001***  -0.042***  
 
0.003  0.000  
RISK -0.005  -0.112  
 
0.766  0.587  
MRETURN -0.005*** -0.039*** 
 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.001 0.024*** 
 0.127 0.000 
CONS 0.031***  0.620***  
 
0.000  0.000  
YEAR Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
OBS. 1718  1718  
ADJ.R2 0.308  0.260  
Dependent variables are bid-ask effective spreads (BAES) and adverse selection costs (ADSC-GH). 
Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; P-values are 











Table 4. The effect of control-ownership divergence and agency problem on stock market 
liquidity  
Var. BAES ADSC-GH BAES ADSC-GH 
     DIVERGENCE 0.012*  0.099  0.005  0.140**  
 
0.096  0.263  0.408  0.037  
SOE -0.001  -0.004  
  
 
0.591  0.767  
  SOE* DIVERGENCE 0.008  0.153**  
  
 
0.393  0.021  
  POORREGION 
  
-0.001  0.004  
   
0.640  0.673  
POORREGION* DIVERGENCE 
  
0.031***  0.135*  
   
0.000  0.055  
CASHFLOW -0.007**  -0.014  -0.006**  -0.007  
 
0.019  0.661  0.024  0.842  
TRA -0.011***  -0.160***  -0.012***  -0.163***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
IO 0.000***  0.006***  0.000  0.005***  
 
0.126  0.000  0.153  0.000  
PRICE 0.001***  0.008***  0.001***  0.008***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.001***  -0.043***  -0.001***  -0.041***  
 
0.003  0.000  0.005  0.000  
RISK -0.006  -0.122  -0.005  -0.110  
 
0.745  554  0.789 0.594  
MRETURN -0.006*** -0.039*** -0.005*** -0.040*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.001 0.024*** 0.001 0.024*** 
 0.128 0.000 0.115 0.000 
CONS 0.031**  0.636***  0.029**  0.600***  
 
0.031  0.000  0.046  0.000  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 1718  1718  1718  1718  
ADJ.R2 0.308  0.261  0.316  0.271  
Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; P-values are 






Table 5. The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on market liquidity 
 
Panel A. Full sample regression results 
Var. BAES ADSC-GH 
   DIVERGENCE 0.050***  0.398***  
 
0.000  0.000  
REFORM -0.001**  -0.020***  
 
0.023  0.001  
REFORM* DIVERGENCE -0.049***  -0.311***  
 
0.000  0.001  
CASHFLOW -0.006**  -0.002  
 
0.035  0.958  
TRA -0.010***  -0.153***  
 
0.000  0.000  
IO 0.001** 0.006***  
 
0.042  0.000  
PRICE 0.001***  0.008***  
 
0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.002***  -0.042***  
 
0.001  0.000  
RISK -0.008 -0.141  
 
0.651  0.491  
MRETURN -0.006*** -0.044*** 
 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.002*** 0.041*** 
 0.006 0.000 
CONS -0.009  0.131  
 
0.697  0.620  
YEAR Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
OBS. 1718  1718  
ADJ.R2 0.325  0.267  
Panel A presents the full sample regression results. Panel B presents the regression results on the SOE and 
non-SOE subsamples. Panel C presents the regression results on firms in regions with poor and strong legal 
systems. Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; P-values are 









Panel B. The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on liquidity in SOEs and 
non-SOEs 
Var. BAES ADSC-GH 
  
 
SOE NON-SOE SOE NON-SOE 
DIVERGENCE 0.058***  0.041***  0.614***  0.051  
 
0.000  0.004  0.000  0.795  
REFORM -0.002**  -0.004  -0.004***  -0.090  
 
0.036  0.189  0.000  0.116  
REFORM*DIVERGENCE -0.053***  -0.053***  -0.488***  0.029  
 
0.000  0.002  0.000  0.906 
CASHFLOW -0.007**  -0.001  -0.011  -0.029  
 
0.022  0.898  0.699  0.750  
TRA -0.009***  -0.013**  -0.119***  -0.261***  
 
0.000  0.014  0.000  0.000  
IO 0.000**  0.000  0.006***  0.007*  
 
0.02  0.675  0.000  0.080  
PRICE 0.001***  0.001***  0.009***  0.007***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.001**  -0.002*  -0.041***  -0.054***  
 
0.027  0.082  0.000  0.001  
RISK 0.001  -0.0067  -0.165  -0.037  
 
0.963  0.198  0.346  0.959  
MRETURN -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.046*** -0.043** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 
MVOL 0.002*** 0.002 0.029*** 0.079*** 
 0.009 0.302 0.000 0.003 
CONS -0.019  0.014  0.479**  -0.813 
 
0.448  0.803  0.043  0.291  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 1232  486  1232  486  











Panel C. The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on liquidity in firms with poor 
and strong legal systems 
var. BAES ADSC-GH 
   
 
POORREGION RICHREGION POORREGION RICHREGION 
DIVERGENCE 0.093***  0.021***  0.365***  0.436***  
 
0.000  0.005  0.000  0.007  
REFORM -0.004**  -0.001  -0.017**  -0.030  
 
0.012  0.525 0.016  0.370  
REFORM*DIVERGENCE -0.089***  -0.024***  -0.318***  -0.303  
 
0.000  0.007  0.003  0.018  
CASHFLOW -0.007  -0.001  -0.013  -0.020  
 
0.131 0.669  0.663  0.742  
TRA -0.016***  -0.007***  -0.101***  -0.232***  
 
0.000  0.006  0.000  0.000  
IO 0.001***  0.000  0.005***  0.009***  
 
0.002  0.485  0.000  0.000  
PRICE 0.001***  0.001***  0.008***  0.009***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.002***  -0.001*  -0.038***  -0.047***  
 
0.009  0.064  0.000  0.000  
RISK 0.009  -0.015  -0.169***  0.026  
 
0.838  0.373  0.0300  0.966  
MRETURN -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.040*** -0.050*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.003** 0.002** 0.029*** 0.057*** 
 0.019 0.023 0.001 0.001 
CONS -0.011  -0.022  0.373  0.205  
 
0.766  0.365  0.124  0.688  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 837  881  837  881  














Full sample Full sample SOE NON-SOE POORREGION RICHREGION 
DIVERGENCE 0.184**  0.379**  1.003***  -0.242  0.707***  -0.124  
 
0.013  0.04  0.000  0.428  0.007  0.638  
REFORM 
 
-0.068*  -0.312***  -0.404***  -0.359***  -0.312***  
  
0.089  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
REFORM*DIVERGENCE -0.298  -0.948***  0.169  -0.827**  0.331  
  
0.156  0.001  0.653  0.006  0.255  
CASHFLOW 0.047  0.041  0.099  0.008  0.068  0.020  
 
0.497  0.466  0.247  0.953  0.503  0.834  
TRA 0.004  0.003  0.028  0.147  0.080  0.067  
 
0.942  0.959  0.699  0.189  0.362  0.443  
IO -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.007  -0.004 0.003  
 
0.606  0.637  0.930  0.325  0.259  0.291  
PRICE -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.012***  -0.010***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.010  0.008  0.008  -0.004  -0.014  0.030*  
 
0.379  0.488  0.566  0.863  0.431  0.069  
RISK -3.509***  -3.480***  -2.489***  -8.025***  -2.470***  -7.378***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
MRETURN -0.222*** -0.217*** -0.212*** -0.228*** -0.209*** -0.236*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.195*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.154*** 0.186*** 0.178*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONS -5.860***  -5.246***  -5.408***  -4.618***  -5.157***  -5.670***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 1718  1718  1232  486  837  881  
ADJ.R2 0.316  0.316  0.309  0.195  0.313  0.347  
Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; P-values are displayed 












Table 7. The effect of control-ownership divergence (before the NTS reform) on change of stock 
liquidity after the NTS reform 
Var. ΔBAES ΔADSC-GH 
   DIVERGENCE -0.036**  -0.174**  
 
0.026  0.037  
CASHFLOW 0.013  0.278***  
 
0.172  0.008  
TRA 0.006  0.360***  
 
0.507  0.002  
IO 0.001  0.002  
 
0.124  0.470  
PRICE 0.000***  -0.001  
 
0.005  0.365  
SIZE -0.002  0.021  
 
0.142  0.189  
RISK 0.037  0.347  
 
0.288  0.364  
MRETURN 0.004 0.286* 
 0.807 0.088 
MVOL -0.006 -0.209 
 0.643 0.16 
CONS 0.212  5.032  
 
0.583  0.239  
YEAR Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
OBS. 345  345  
ADJ.R2 0.086  0.067 
ΔBAES and ΔADSC-GH represent the change in the bid-ask spread and adverse selection cost after the NTS 
reform, which equals the average BAES and ADSC-GH in the post-NTS reform period minus the average of the 
pre-NTS reform period. Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; 
all independent variables are the average value during the pre-reform period; P-values are displayed below the 









Table 8. The effect of control-ownership divergence on stock liquidity (low frequency) 
Var. LNVOL TURNOVER LNILLIQ LNVOL TURNOVER LNILLIQ 
       DIVERGENCE -0.933***  -0.012**  0.824***  -1.171***  -0.009  1.320***  
 
0.000  0.034  0.000  0.000  0.308  0.000  
REFORM 
   
0.250***  0.006***  -0.281***  
    
0.000  0.001  0.000  
REFORM* DIVERGENCE 
   
0.389**  0.004  -0.786**  
    
0.039  0.642  0.023  
CASHFLOW -0.573***  -0.003  0.473***  -0.577***  -0.003  0.484***  
 
0.000  0.313  0.000  0.000  0.337  0.000  
TRA 0.728***  0.007***  -1.130***  0.732***  -0.007**  -1.133***  
 
0.000  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.011  0.000  
IO 0.013***  0.001**  -0.013***  0.011***  0.000**  -0.012***  
 
0.001  0.012  0.001  0.002  0.017  0.004  
PRICE -0.017***  0.000*  0.023***  -0.017***  0.000*  0.023***  
 
0.000  0.069  0.000  0.000  0.091  0.000  
SIZE 0.772***  -0.004***  -0.879***  0.768***  -0.004***  -0.876***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
RISK 3.195***  0.042**  7.643***  3.272***  0.044**  7.547***  
 
0.000  0.044  0.000  0.000  0.037  0.000  
MRETURN 0.001 0.009*** -0.194*** 0.033* 0.010*** -0.233*** 
 0.965 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.568*** 0.010*** -0.331*** 0.456*** 0.008*** -0.196*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONS -16.356***  -0.178***  8.288***  -13.070***  -0.107***  4.343***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 1718  1718  1718  1718  1718  1718  
ADJ.R2 0.853  0.405  0.816  0.855  0.408  0.820  
Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; P-values are displayed 









Table 9. The effect of control-ownership divergence and NTS reform on stock liquidity of SOEs controlled 
by central and local governments 
Var. BAES ADSC-GH 
 
CENTRALSOE LOCALSOE CENTRALSOE LOCALSOE 
DIVERGENCE -0.008  0.075***  0.110  0.683***  
 
0.313  0.000  0.334  0.000  
REFORM -0.001  0.001  -0.026  0.006***  
 
0.410  0.573  0.194  0.003  
REFORM* DIVERGENCE 0.002  -0.071***  -0.073  -0.591***  
 
0.779  0.000  0.562  0.000  
CASHFLOW -0.000  -0.014***  0.037  -0.067*  
 
0.969  0.004  0.380  0.074  
TRA -0.008***  -0.015***  -0.109***  -0.244***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  
IO -0.000  0.000***  0.001  0.006***  
 
0.729  0.004  0.399  0.000  
PRICE 0.001***  0.001***  0.011***  0.010***  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SIZE -0.003***  -0.000  -0.043***  -0.043***  
 
0.000  0.914  0.000  0.000  
RISK 0.114**  0.012  4.203***  -0.013  
 
0.015  0.576  0.000  0.951  
MRETURN -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.043*** -0.066*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MVOL 0.001 0.001 -0.024** 0.025** 
 0.248 0.556 0.032 0.017 
CONS 0.045**  0.007  1.918***  0.733**  
 
0.040  0.823  0.000  0.016  
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS. 350  881  350  881  
ADJ.R2 0.630  0.275  0.544  0.332  
‘CENTRALSOE’ and ‘LOCALSOE’ represent SOEs controlled by the central government and local 
governments respectively. Variable definitions are detailed in Table 1; CONS is the constant for each regression; 
P-values are displayed below the coefficients; and *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
 
 
